La carta de killinger de lo que piensa declarar en el subcomité del senado
28 páginas, por si le 'pasara algo'...
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I believe Washington Mutual should NOT have been seized and sold for bargain price.
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When I left the Bank in early September of 2008, its capital greatly exceeded
regulatory requirements for a well-capitalized bank. Deposits were stable, sources
of liquidity appeared adequate, and our primary regulator, the Office of Thrift
Supervision (“OTS”), had not directed us to seek additional outside capital or find a
merger partner.
It was with shock and great sadness that I read of the seizure and bargain sale of
Washington Mutual on September 25, 2008. I recognize that policy makers and
Regulators had no blueprint for dealing with the worldwide financial crisis that
developed in the aftermath of the collapse of Lehman Brothers. But I believe that
Washington Mutual’s seizure was unnecessary, and the Company should have been
given a chance to work its way through the crisis. I also believe it was unfair that
Washington Mutual was not given the benefits extended to and actions taken on
behalf of other financial services companies within days of the Company’s seizure,
such as the following:
! The FDIC’s insurance limit increase to $250,000;
! The FDIC guarantee of bank debt;
! The Federal Reserve injection of liquidity and purchase of assets;
! The Treasury Department announcement of favorable treatment of tax losses;
and
! Injection of capital into all major banks through the Troubled Asset Relief
Program.
The unfair treatment of WashingtonMutual did not begin with its unnecessary
seizure. In July 2008, Washington Mutual was excluded from the “do not short” list,
which protected large Wall Street banks from abusive short selling. The Company
was similarly excluded from hundreds of meetings and telephone calls between
Wall Street executives and policy leaders that ultimately determined the winners
and losers in this financial crisis. For those that were part of the inner circle and
were “too clubby to fail,” the benefits were obvious. For those outside of the club,
the penalty was severe.
In my view, the actions taken by policymakers reflect a vision of a banking industry
dominated by largeWall Street banks. Consumer-based banks likeWashington
Mutual were not included in this vision, and consequently were not extended the
same protections. I believe this was a mistake. I fear that consumers will ultimately
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"As of June 30, 2008, the Company estimated that it had about
$50 billion of readily available liquidity."
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By the end of 2007, we had 2,257 branches serving customers
with 19.4 million transaction accounts. Measured by revenues for 2007, our largest business was Retail Banking with $8.3 billion, followed by Card Services at $4 billion, Home Loans at $1.9 billion, and the Commercial group at $850 million.
