Washington Mutual demanda a la FDIC por 17 billones US$ + daños

Para contestar algo de lo que se está comentando da igual si las acciones son Pre o Post 25 Sept.

Hammr6 el profesional se está encargando de conducir el tema del EC con el Trustee nos advertía de que Weil solo mira por quien le paga los cuartos. Weil no han dicho ninguna mentira pero tampoco han dicho la verdad. Ellos se limitaron a decir que a fecha de hoy es imposible pagar comunes y preferentes porque A < P. La pena es que en el gobierno USA no haya abogados tan potentes como los que tienen ellos que les digan si señores pero y ¿que pasa con los $4Billones que se tienen que fallar y los $3 Billones de NOL´s y todos los Billones que se obtengan de la litigación?

Voy a visualizar la jugada desde un punto de vista gris ni negro ni blanco, creo y estoy casi convencido que la Juez está con nosotros y sabe que algo se cuece por eso la premura de firmarlo de un día para otro y el martes de esta semana nuestros abogados deberían tener el papel y empezar a contactar con los máximos accionistas todo eso llevará un tiempo y lo que esperamos es que no tardemos mucho como para que llegue marzo y no tengamos nada. La juez si no falla en los $4 Billones hasta que tengamos el EC avanzado creo que nos podría hacer un favor.

Creo que estan haciendo un full respecto a las comunes y deben hacer creer a la gente que no van a cobrar cuando puede que sea todo lo contrario. Sino ¿a que coño tienen los millones de acciones comunes los principales bancos del pais? ese es el motivo por el que necesitamos saber que tiene cada uno de los principales jugadores.
Ahora JPM tambien nos ha lanzado un guiño diciendonos señores que los que dirigen el tema tampoco son santos. La verdad que Wall Street es la mayor casa de putas y buitres carroñeros del mundo. La corrupción no está en el nivel inferior como en España sino que está en la cúpula que dirige todo (Rockefellers, Rothschild...)

Ha sido un palo para muchos de nosotros pero quiero ver que ocurre en los próximos 30 días pues la guerra ni de lejos está aun perdida como algunos quieren interpretar.
Quedan muchas cosas que tienen que ocurrir desde aquí hasta Marzo 2010.

Como muchos sabreis Weil tb está llevando el tema de Lehman y tb se opusieron a que se formara un EC. Aquí os dejo el documento que presentaron para oponerse.
Esperad un documento parecido para WAMU.

http://www.willaw.com/lehman/lehmandocs/905-Debtor's%20Opposition%20to%20Appt.%20Equity%20Comm..pdf

Hay una enorme diferencia entre los 2 casos, Lehman cotiza los bonos a 10 cents por dollar mientras que WAMU cotiza a 90 cents por dollar así que ese argumento por si solo nos ayuda a la formación de un EC.

Tened fe, vamos a salir de esta situación y nuestro EC se aprobará. ¿o es que alguien pensó que pegar el pelotazo iba a ser tan sencillo como comprar y esperar? para que estas cosas ocurran también hay que saber sufrir pues el premio al final estará ahi para los más fuertes de corazón y de mente.

Usad Google traductor los que no hableis inglés.
Lo importante es la disección de los principales motivos por los que nuestro caso
es totalmente diferente y Weil lo va a tener muy dificil para detener nuestra petición de EC.

He aquí los argumentos.

Quote:
2. The interests of equity security holders are adequately represented
by the directors and management of LBHI. They have a fiduciary responsibility to LBHI
that encompasses the interests of equity holders.

Respuesta:
in our case, the interests of equity and directors/management may overlap, but they are certainly not encompassed. not to mention our directors and management have done absolutely *nothing* to inform past or present shareholders of *anything*.

Quote
Further, the Debtors’ equity interest
holders include numerous large institutional investors who possess the resources and
ability to protect their interests without the formation of a committee. The activities of an
equity committee would only duplicate the efforts of such parties, and would not result in
appreciably more representation for equity holders.

Respuesta:
i think joyce has that one covered.. i'm going to assume that everyone who contacted her and sent in a letter was retail.

Quote
3. The financial condition of the Debtors has not yet been
determined. However, based upon the information available it is unlikely that equity
interest holders have any economic stake in the Debtors. The financial collapse of the
Debtors has resulted in huge losses that will be asserted by claimants having priority over
equity interest holders. The current market prices for LBHI’s shares of common stock
and its debt imply that any distribution to equity holders is highly unlikely.

Respuesta:
not the case with us, at all.

Quote
4. The appointment of an equity committee would increase
administrative expenses in exchange for little, if any, increased representation for the
equity holders, at the cost of the creditors having allowed claims.
Controlling Legal Standard

Respuesta:
*i* would say any increase from 0 representation is proportionately significant, i don't know if the court would agree. "at the cost of the creditors" is going to be a tough sell when debt's at around 90.

Quote
5. Section 1102(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code provides, in pertinent part, that “
◦n request of a party in interest, the court may order the appointment of additional committees of creditors or of equity security holders if necessary to assure adequate representation of creditors or equity security holders.” The Bankruptcy Code does not define the term “adequate representation.” In re National R.V. Holdings, Inc.,
390 B.R. 690, 695 (Bankr. C.D.Cal. 2008). Instead, courts retain the discretion to
appoint an equity committee based on the facts of each individual case. In re Williams
Communications Group, Inc., 281 B.R. 216, 220 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002) (citing Albero
v. Johns-Manville Corp. (In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 68 B.R. 155, 159 (S.D.N.Y.
1986)).
6. Courts have considered a number of factors in evaluating the need
for an equity committee. Most notably, an equity committee “should not be appointed
unless equity holders establish that (i) there is a substantial likelihood that they will
receive a meaningful distribution in the case under a strict application of the absolute
priority rule, and (ii) they are unable to represent their interests in the bankruptcy case
without an official committee.” Williams, 281 B.R. at 223. An equity committee should
not be appointed if the debtors appears hopelessly insolvent “because neither the debtor
nor the creditors should have to bear the expense of negotiating over the terms of what is
in essence a gift.” Id. at 220 (citing In re Emons Industries, Inc., 50 B.R. 692, 694
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985)).

Respuesta:
thanks for making our case for us

Quote
7. In addition to those determinants, courts have also considered the following factors: (i) the number of shareholders, and whether the shares are publicly traded; (ii) the size and complexity of the chapter 11 case; (iii) the delay and additional cost that would result from the appointment of an equity committee; (iv) the likelihood that the debtor is solvent; and (v) the timing of the motion relative to the status of the chapter 11 case. National R.V., 390 B.R. at 695-6 (citing In re Leap Wireless Int'l, Inc.,
295 B.R. 135, 137 (Bankr. S.D.Cal. 2003); Williams, 281 B.R. at 220; In re Wang
Laboratories, Inc., 149 B.R. 1, 2 (Bankr. D.Mass. 1992)).

Respuesta:
iii - delay, possibly. cost would be coming out of equity's slice anyway.

Quote

8. Not every case with a large number of shareholders warrants an
official equity committee. Williams, 281 B.R. at 223 (citing Wang, 149 B.R. at 2). If an
equity committee were necessary in every large case, Congress “would have mandated
the appointment of equity committees instead of leaving it within the discretion of the
UST and the Court.” Id. (citing Albero v. Johns-Manville, 68 B.R. at 160).

this is at the discretion of the UST, oops!

Quote

9. The burden rests on the movant to show that an additional
committee is necessary for adequate representation. In re Dana Corp., 344 B.R. 35, 38
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006); In re Enron Corp., 279 B.R. 671, 685 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002).

Respuesta:
how about equity-antagonistic creditors? thx unsecured creditors.

Quote

10. The appointment of an equity committee is “an extraordinary remedy” and should be “the rare exception.” National R.V., 390 B.R. at 695 (citing
Dana, 344 B.R. at 38; Enron, 279 B.R. at 685, et al.); Williams, 281 B.R. at 223.
I. An Equity Committee Should Not Be Appointed Until It is Clear That Equity Holders Have an Economic Interest in the Chapter 11 Cases
11. An equity committee should not be appointed unless it appears likely that the equity holders will receive a meaningful distribution. Williams, 281 B.R. at 223. Though there is no clear litmus test for solvency, the court in Williams examined
the following evidence:
(i) the difference between the debtor’s reported assets and liabilities; ( Yes, let's look at those, and the Notes section )
(ii) the trading price of the debtor’s publicly held stock and bonds; and 90% baby
(iii) the partial recovery to creditors and other parties under a proposed plan. Id. at 220-1.
that's up to weil

12. These chapter 11 cases were filed less than one month ago, and it remains far too early to determine whether the equity holders will receive any meaningful distribution. The Debtors have not yet proposed a plan of reorganization or even fully set out a schedule of their assets and liabilities. The deadline to file proofs of claim has not yet expired, and it remains unclear what demands will be made on the Debtors’ estates.
Though much of this information is forthcoming, the degree of uncertainty remains too
high to justifiably conclude that the equity holders will receive a distribution in these
chapter 11 cases.

Respuesta:
not applicable

Quote
13. Lehman’s stock is currently trading for approximately 11 cents per share, a nearly 100 percent drop in value from its price only months ago. Even more tellingly, Lehman’s unsecured debt largely is trading at less than 10 cents on the dollar, suggesting that market participants believe the prospects for substantial repayment to
creditors are slim. See Table of Lehman Bond Prices, attached as Exhibit A. An auction
of derivatives tied to Lehman Bonds held on October 10, 2008 set a price of 8.625 cents
on the dollar for Lehman bonds, further corroborating that informed markets do not
expect a substantial payout to Lehman’s creditors. See Press Release, Markit Group
Limited, Creditex and Markit Announce Final Results of Lehman Credit Event Auction
(October 10, 2008), attached as Exhibit B. If the likelihood of a full recovery to creditors
is slight, the prospects for a residual payment to shareholders are even more dire.

Respuesta:
yeah, not here

Quote
II. The Added Cost to the Estates of an Equity Committee Far Outweighs Any Minimal Increase in Representation for Equity Holders 14. In determining whether to appoint an equity committee, courts apply a balancing test to weigh the cost of an equity committee against the concern for adequate representation. Wang, 149 B.R. at 3. The appointment of an equity committee
would significantly increase costs to the Debtors, since such appointments are “closely
followed by applications to retain attorneys and accountants.” In re Saxon Indus., Inc.,
39 B.R. 945, 947 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984). In addition to the direct cost of maintaining an
additional staff of professionals, the appointment of an equity committee would impose
intangible costs on the Debtors’s estates, such as delay and disruption in the
administration of these chapter 11 cases. See Albero v. Johns-Manville, 68 B.R. at 160.
The appointment of an additional committee would stymie the chapter 11 process in
exchange for little, if any, benefit to equity holders.

Respuesta:
here's a good one.. at least $7.5B worth in face value in the preferred equity alone is at stake (let's take weil's claim that the REITs are in play at face value). not counting 1.7billion common. the relative cost of representation for equity is miniscule in comparison.

http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/2009/12/wamuprivilege.html

En un principio según tengo entendido el maximo responsable para la aprobación del EC es el administrador usa, es decir que él es el que tiene que aprobar el EC.

Saludos

Maximun: Así es, el Trustee es la pieza clave ahora mismo para que el EC se apruebe.
El nos lo denego la primera vez cuando no aportamos nada. Tras esa negativa nos pusimos las pilas y creamos los grupos de trabajo que aportaron 3500 cartas con más de 100 millones de acciones comunes y el 20% de las P´s.

Más se estan agregando cada día pero el Trustee ahora parece entender que WAMU no es el tipico caso de Ch 11 y que debe maximizar el valor de los accionistas y crear un EC.

Weil esta vez creo que lo tiene crudo pues contamos con muy buena representación por parte de abogados pro bono que ya han hecho esto en otras ocasiones y que son los que nos advirtieron q o nos poniamos las pilas o nos quedariamos como se han quedado los pobres de CIT ante los bonistas. Son 2 casos distintos porque aquí si hay y mucho que recuperar.

Lo más probable que ocurra si no hay settlement es que una parte se reciba ($7Billones) se refleje en las acciones y el resto se meta en un "litigation trust". Pero creo que aquí hay una contrareloj para llegar a Marzo con una solución y a la vez que lleguemos a tiempo para cortar el pastel resultante de las negociaciones.

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US Trustee: "Your honor, our office recently determined, the acting US Trustee's, election to solicit interest in forming an official committee of equity security holders. Last week we reached out to the Debtors seeking a list of the equity security holders of Washington Mutual Inc's so that we could begin to get that process underway. The response at that time was "well we have other matters, we will address it when we can". I put a 48 hour deadline on my communication to Debtors' counsel December 8th. That came and went. We got to this week, yesterday received a communication from Debtors' counsel with respect to timing indicating that they anticipate to be able to get us information early next week. The problem we have, Your Honor, is that we would like to move forward with the solicitation by getting it at least started before we get to the holidays that are coming up and we cannot afford to forebare [?] on this issue into next week. We are asking for entry of a court order today that sets a deadline of December 21st for production of the list."

Walrath: "I want to hear from the Debtor."

WMI: "Your Honor, this is a little bit more than what was just relayed and I do take a little bit of offense at the misrepresentation about "we have other things to do" because that was not the answer that was given. Your Honor, since this case filed last September, the US Trustee on several occasions has asked us what our position is with respect to the formation of an equity committee. He reached out to us in writing and we, each of those instances, formally replied, pointing out to the US Trustee the monthly operating reports what the Debtors' position is on assets and liabilities and how, where things are with respect to the various litigations. While that ultimately does not impact what the US Trustee's position is, whether or not he will form an equity committee, it certainly established in our mind, and in the mind of the Creditors Committee and I believe other parties that the US Trustee had solicited, that the equity holders are not going to be in the money here, either the preferred or common equity holders. One of the things that the Trustee knows, because we have talked with him about it, is that there is a seven and a half billion dollar preferred, three series of... actually more but... grouped into three groups... seven and a half billion dollars of preferred equity before the commons. And, in as much as we don't even think that that strata of preferred will be reached by way of a distribution, we're a little bit surprised that the Trustee is going to be taking the time and the energy, and certainly the expense, of seeking to form an equity committee. When the Trustee reached out to me last week, Your Honor, I let him know that it does take time to do this, what he was requesting, and that we would make the effort and ask the transfer agent to provide the information that he sought. We do have, Your Honor, we have here today, a disc which sets forth the information as it was filed with the court over a year ago. The problem is that the Trustee has said that he doesn't want the information as of a year ago, he wants the information new. So it requires the transfer agent to collect the data again. Your Honor, we would like to provide this to the US Trustee, we are not in possession of it. I can only give the Trustee what I have. We have told the Trustee, as late as yesterday before he filed his motion, that we thought we would get it to him probably Tuesday of next week. For some reason he filed this motion saying give it to me on Monday of next week. Again Your Honor, we cannot give what we do not have, it is not in the Debtors' possession to do it. If in fact we get raw data from the transfer agent, we're happy to give it to him, but that is not what the US Trustee has asked for. He wants information in some sort of sortable format that he may go through it.

Walrath: "Has the transfer agent told you that you will get it by Tuesday?"

WMI: "Yes Your Honor, and that's what we communicated to the Trustee. And so, I don't know why we're here, honestly, on this issue, because we can't be compelled to give something that we don't have. So Your Honor we will endeavor to give it to him on Tuesday, and if we don't have it from the transfer agent, all I can do, Your Honor, is tell you, and tell the US Trustee, that the transfer agent has not given it to us. But I am happy to give the US Trustee the year old information. I don't know how it has changed since that point in time, but I'm happy to give it to him... something he already has.. but I'm happy to give it to him in disc format."

Walrath: "Thank you."

US Trustee: "Your Honor, with respect to the matter, in light of Debtors' counsel's comments, perhaps the way we should deal with this is in two formats. I will accept the discs that Debtors' counsel has and I suggest that we revise the order and provide that the information from the transfer agent be turned over by Tuesday in whatever form it is and we'll address it on our end.

Walrath: "Well, I think I can only direct them to turn it over when they get it."

US Trustee: "Understood Your Honor. The representation was made to us was that they would have it, at least that was the transfer agent's representation, so provided the Debtors' counsel has no objection to revision to the form of order that would provide that they will provide that information to us immediately upon receipt of same from transfer agent then we will be fine."

Walrath: "All right."

WMI: "Your Honor, I don't have a problem with that, I just don't know whether or not it will be in the sortable form that he is requesting. But he did say he would take it in whatever form, so I'll give him that format."

Walrath: "Well you asked for it in sortable."

WMI: "He did, yes."

Walrath: "Did you ask the transfer agent..."

WMI: "They don't give it to you in that format. We have to, when we created this disc a year ago, Your Honor, we had to do some work on it... it's something that happens quickly... but it takes us a good day to do it, so... I assume he wants it in an easily usable form."

US Trustee: "Your Honor, at this point in the process I gather that time is more important than utility, so consistent with my prior comments we'll revise the form of order and submit it to Debtors for their approval and we will look for the information next week."

Unknown: [unintelligible]

Walrath: " [unintelligible]... revised form of order under... [unintelligible]"

WMI: "That's fine Your Honor. And I just want to say one other thing. I appreciate the Trustee's efforts. I realize that there are forces to bear that may be asking him to do this. And as I told the US Trustee and I'll say again on the record, Your Honor, based upon the economics of this case, if in fact the Trustee after his solicitation decides that he will form some sort of committee like he has suggested, the Debtors will be taking... exercising their rights with respect to that formation."

Una cosa que me sorprende bastante es que no tengan ninguna versión más acutal de la lista de acciones, que no sea la de la incautación de más de hace un año, lo que me hace sospechar que nuncan han tenido en cuenta a la equidad en las negociaciones. Es bastante aceptado en los foros usa, viendo documentos de la balanza de pagos, que probablemente bodermann vendió todas sus acciones comunes y compró muchos bonos, de ahi la razón que los bonos wamu cotizen a estos niveles del 90%, por lo que para boderman sería mucho más rentable para maximizar sus beneficios cancelar toda la equidad y emitir nuevas acciones que se repartirían entre los bonistas en la nueva empresa reorganizada de wmi, y estas serían las acciones que se beneficiarían de los exitos de los litigios pendientes. Vamos justo lo que acordaron los bonistas de CIT.

Teniendo en cuenta que Boderman es quien paga a Weil, se entiende mucho mejor las palabras de Weil de cancelar la equidad.

En usa están bastante calentitos con este tema, porque despues de 1 año y pico, proporcionando información a Weil, apoyando con la multitud de foros y dos paginas webs que han creado, etc... que ahora Weil haga estas declaraciones tan nefastas en contra de la equidad sin ningún giño positivo de cara al futuro como en otras ocasiones, no han caido nada bien.

Saludos