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Washington Mutual demanda a la FDIC por 17 billones US$ + daños

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Washington Mutual demanda a la FDIC por 17 billones US$ + daños
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Washington Mutual demanda a la FDIC por 17 billones US$ + daños
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#18081

Re: Acerte y mañana cerraremos por debajo de 19......................camino de los 15 pavos

Ten Shin le estas quitando el puesto de Nostradamus a Maximunae.

Al final alcanzarás la cátedra en OTC.

Aciertas hasta los cierres diarios, ni Jim Cramer.

Por favor pasa los precios optimos de compra para entrar todos a la vez y hacer subir las acciones en estampida de una vez.

#18082

Plan de ataque de Susman

It appears that EC and Susman's strongest position lies within the releases that both FDIC and JPM desire from equity and all other participants. Since the Judge denied these third party releases, it is unclear how just how important they are (from a financial point of view.) Obviously, JPM and FDIC could agree to a quickly modified POR whereby equity is left to fight on its own which will likely include TPS. Some key questions here are how long this could take, who would take the brunt of the financial cost to bring these claims before court, and what would the result be after a lengthy court battle against both JPM and FDIC with big pockets?

Without trial, I believe the key is squeezing as much money out of JPM and FDIC in exchange for full releases. The hedgies won't like it, but they will not be able to do anything about it if the money coming back to the estate pays all bondholders and creditors with the waterfall going to equity including TPS.

So, the big question is how much can Susman get for the WMI estate from JPM and FDIC by offering full releases and thus allowing them to avoid a trial that could cost them tens of billions of dollars?

I posted this previously and will repeat what I think Susman can get to settle this in the near future. I believe he may be able to negotiate the following deal with JPM and FDIC.

1. The 4b deposit
2. All of the tax refunds totalling over 5b
3. A cash payout on BOLI/COLI with JPM retaining all policies. This would not be face, but some real surrender value based on some future date. Not going to be anywhere near 5b, but could be several hundred million.
4. JPM taking on the TPS preferreds and keeping all of the TPS securities. I know this was denied by the Judge, but believe this will be negotiated by Susman as an alternative to claims of the FC of funds, etc, etc, etc.
5. The estate will receive cash consideration from JPM for assets that were obviously part of WMI and not WMB. Let's say around 1b.
6. FDIC throws in some of the 1.9b it received from JPM. Let's say just over half - 1b.

If Susman can pull this deal off, all debtors and creditors will be paid in full and will have no control of remaining WMI. Susman will negotiate enough money that, inclusive of the remaining assets, the preferreds are made whole and the commons will get control of reorganized company with billions in NOLs.

No, it's nowhere near what we could get many years down the road if successful, but this deal means TPS taken care of by JPM, preferreds are whole, and commons own the remaining WMI estate which will not have much value (maybe 1 to 2b including remaining cash). However, the estate will have billions of NOLs which could ultimately mean $2 to 3 a share once someone buys these NOLs if and when it can be worked out.

Susman may be shooting for much more, but equity is in the driver's seat with regards to the releases. As a common holder, would you give up releases for nothing? Absolutely, not. However, to avoid a difficult trial situation whereby the POR kicked equity to the curb, the commons could see $2 to 3 via the NOLs, I surely believe that the commons would go for it.

#18083

Re: Plan de ataque de Susman

No veo dónde entran los WMB bondholders en este maravilloso plan.

#18085

Interesante análisis sobre la decisión de la CORTE

The Court Opinions Simplified pt. 1 of 2

For the BK court, it’s about who get paid and by how much. It’s been dictated by the “paramount interests of creditors” and the “lowest point in the range of reasonableness”. As long as the compromise among disputing parties satisfies this line of thought, the court is ok with it, barring any proven frauds or willful misconducts. I think this is why the court goes along with the majority of arguments in GSA and concludes it “fair and reasonable”. I disagree with the court, but the reality is that is what the court opined.

The court’s treatment of the positions of JPMC and FDIC is interesting. On one hand, she takes their arguments, including the unsubstantiated $54B claims, as they are presented to the court on face value without questioning the validity of the arguments. She simply goes along with the debtors’ reasoning that it’s too complicated and difficult [to fight those two entities], and the debtors cannot get a better result than GSA. This makes me feel the court acted “arbitrarily”, or to borrow a better term used by marymboth, such reasoning seems “incomplete”. After reading through the court opinions, I have an impression that JPMC and FDIC are untouchable.” (This doesn’t mean I think it is right or it’s the case). On the other hand, the court agrees with us that the debtors have "a strong likelihood of success" or "a fair likelihood of prevailing" on a number of key claims against JPMC and FDIC. On the contrary, she never substantiates the positions of JPMC and FDIC as valid or merit-worthy. Meanwhile, she leaves the door open for shareholder to pursue litigations against both of them (no third party releases). That's a powerful combination. It seems that the writing’s on the wall. This court may not touch you because of the limited mandate and scope of BK court. That doesn’t mean you’re untouchable. The door for lawsuits against both parties are left open, and this court even validated a few key claims against you for those who want to pursue them. The court fan the flames a little further by inserting a strange remark associating $4B deposit issue with the danger of “another bank collapse”. True or false, the remark not only puts the court’s credibility on the line, but surely will stir up deep suspicions about JPMC conducts, its image as Wall Street insider and political connections, as well as government influences if this case ever goes to jury trial with wider public attention. It’s clear to me both JPMC and FDIC are in fact very “touchable” and vulnerable. They can choose to run the risk with unforeseen ramifications of shareholder lawsuits or pursue comprehensive settlement with parties including WMI equity shareholders.


As for creditors, the court doesn’t like them. She tears up the lies about the value of the reorganized company, and shows WMRRC is undervalued (likely intentionally by creditors) point by point. She allows small retail H shareholders to participate in the reorganized WMI. The court also reserves her decision on FJR vs. contract rate, and acknowledges that EC’s position on H share reclassification warrants further deliberation. She allowed the new NOL to become a reality into 2011, and acknowledges the existence of $5B NOL formally in her opinion. She is telling the creditors/hedge funds that she understands the game played by them without showing all cards at her own disposal. She outmaneuvered them into a corner. Any of above issues has potential to disrupt or end the creditors’ plan to kill the equity and loot the Estate, both the old and the reborn. They can either run the risk by ignoring the uncertainty on those issues or be more practical to cut deals with adversary parties seriously.

For the debtors, while the court agrees with them on the majority of GSA positions, the bottom line is she denied the confirmation of their Plan. She also denied third party releases forced upon unsettled parties, which are critical to the debtors’ BOD, officers, and professionals. Ironically, the strength that the court acknowledges in her opinion regarding the debtors disputes with JPMC and FDIC can be picked up and utilized by the EC/equity shareholders to leverage against GSAs.

As for EC, the court took out most of its favorite arguments and shot them down one by one, no matter they are COI, good faith issue, attorney-client privileges issue, Martin factors, etc. I disagree strongly with the court opinions on many of those issues, but the reality is that is what she did. The equity won the Release issue, see great hope in NOL, and in a number of other subtle issues, subject to the court blessing. The message is to be realistic and practical with your expectations.

Overall, she leveled the playing field a little so players should level their heads, temper their emotions, moderate their expectations accordingly, and under her watch, play fair.

It’s in this context, I stated ( a couple days ago) that “this court is smart. She might have set the camp/house on fire. It’s now up to all participating parties to put out the fire before it’s too later.” In other words, she exposed the weaknesses and vulnerable spots of every party involved, shot the POR down, and the house is now on fire. In situation like this, no one is safe and everyone’s interests become intertwined. To save oneself, you have to cooperate with others. Otherwise, everyone is or will be a loser at one point or another.

(I’m embarrassed to say I read the court’s opinions only once. I truly wish I could have more time and energy to read the materials more times in order to reduce the chance of overlooking or misunderstanding. Please always treat my analysis with a grain of salt, and do your own DD independently.)

#18086

Re: Interesante análisis sobre la decisión de la CORTE

Yo estoy de acuerdo con esta opinión, yo también pienso que la Jueza ha dado y quitado un poco a todos...

De todos modos en su 'opinión' muchas veces dice que 'con las pruebas presentadas...'.

Estoy seguro que si se presentan las pruebas adecuadas, podría cambiar de idea en más de una de las opiniones que ha escrito. Para bien y para mal, claro.

Veamos qué va pasando poco a poco...

#18087

Re: Interpretación de un forista sobre un comentario de la Corte

The more I have been thinking abour the ER and the Judge's Opinion regarding that comment on how it being unlikely that equity would see any distribution/recovery....

I have been given some thought that it could be mentioned only in the respect of a safeguard to prevent the pps of the equities from running away/amuck and have more hedgies/vulture day traders jump into the shares and run the share prices sky high.... (We all know how quickly the markets react and Over react)..Could you imagine what the pps of the equities would be if either the ER and / or the Judges' Opinion would have given a fully positive sign to equity holders that recovery was on the way ??? Would then probably made a settlement agreement between all parties way out of control...

Not sure if my thinking on this is coherent....calling it a night and will see what develops in the days ahead....But although the Opinion has left many WaMuers questioning certain issues I do believe Judge Walrath is very very wise and although we may not see the picture from her bench...she surely is in control of her court and knows exactly and specificly what she is doing and where she is seeking to guide parties to a set goal....(I might now see it or I even may have disagreements on the process) But up through today's date it has just been that the opposing parties have just been too stubron to move in the direction that the court is seeking to have parties meet at....

good luck WaMuers and thanks to all the good people that add substance to our msg board

#18088

Preferentes en 18 dolares

os lo dije vamos a llegar a niveles de dolor inimaginables.y mientras tanto el EC sin abrir la boca,estomagos agradecidos

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