Washington Mutual demanda a la FDIC por 17 billones US$ + daños

First, thanks to observer4101, wamurocks and others for pointing out the debtor parties/creditors' intimidation tactics aimed at former Wamu employees. Based on the shame GSA/POR, the debtor parties (creditors included) intend to gift away billions of the estate tax refund and give up more serious claims worthy of another tens of billions of dollars against JPMC and FDIC. Moreover, for over two years the debtor parties had never deposed even a single employee from either JPMC or FDIC. Now, all of a sudden, they are interested in chasing down former Wamu employees for token moneys (measured in this case) in the midst of the examiner investigation. They must feel threatened by the examiner's ongoing interviews with those wamu employees (including its former CEO), and intend to play scare tactics to suppress their voices (or to play off them against one another).

When I think of the debtors’ intimidation games, I’ve got to appreciate the brilliance of Susman team’s strategy of forcefully pursuing the examiner issue even more. Don’t forget, Susman’s firm is based in Houston and New York, but it has a strong presence in the Northwestern area too. In fact, except Mr. Susman, three other major EC counsels Parker Folse, Justin Nelson, and Edgar Sargent are all based in Seattle area. One (Susman &Godfrey) is the prominent legal firm in the city, another (WaMu) was once one of the top employers in the area. It’s both natural and probable that EC attorneys know some of the former wamu employees at either business, professional, or even personal levels. I often wondered why people in Seattle and Washington State never thought of revenge against the clear Washington’s (D.C.) abuse of power, and the corruption of Wall Street insiders in bringing down one of the city and state’s primary taxpayers and employers? However, it shouldn’t be a surprise if the EC attorneys have already received tips, facts and opinions about WaMu saga, good or bad, from their local connections even before they were on board. In my view, it’s inconceivable that Susman team has placed its bet on the examiner investigation, and pushed hard like hell for it if they had not already gained a certain amount of knowledge about (including those from locals) and a certain level of confidence in the case.

When what the former employees told the examiner matches the facts and what the EC already knows about, the debtor parties will be doomed.

Short Interest for the First Half of September
Stock/Date........Short.....Avg Volume....Days to Cover

WAMUQ
Sept 15, 2010....40,309,717......3,692,323.....10.92
Aug 31, 2010.....40,359,565......9,879,506......4.09
Aug 13, 2010.....40,338,600......3,661,962.....11.02
Jul 30, 2010.....40,290,076......6,417,015......6.28
Jul 15, 2010.....40,242,050......4,765,896......8.44
Jun 30, 2010.....40,327,668......6,634,654......6.08
Jun 15, 2010.....40,345,526.....20,568,724......1.96
May 28, 2010.....40,964,493.....12,019,972......3.41
May 14, 2010.....40,420,944.....11,759,180......3.44
Apr 30, 2010.....40,495,460......8,888,658......4.56

WAMKQ
Sept 15, 2010....210,400......56,807.....3.70
Aug 31, 2010.....303,000......34,705.....8.73
Aug 13, 2010.....303,299......34,310.....8.84
Jul 30, 2010.....303,399......49,878.....6.08
Jul 15, 2010.....316,458......57,423.....5.51
Jun 30, 2010.....301,668......69,185.....4.36
Jun 15, 2010.....311,947.....159,398.....1.96
May 28, 2010.....309,817.....228,080.....1.36
May 14, 2010.....329,914.....141,117.....2.34
Apr 30, 2010.....313,482.....128,458.....2.44

WAMPQ
Sept 15, 2010....15,174......8,923.....1.70
Aug 31, 2010.....15,070.....16,982.....1.00
Aug 13, 2010.....14,982.....10,959.....1.37
Jul 30, 2010.....15,768.....11,983.....1.32
Jul 15, 2010.....15,400......8,431.....1.83
Jun 30, 2010.....15,277.....11,031.....1.38
Jun 15, 2010.....18,436.....16,085.....1.15
May 28, 2010.....31,303.....36,136.....1.00
May 14, 2010.....15,864.....12,301.....1.29
Apr 30, 2010.....17,178.....13,403.....1.28

WAHUQ
Sept 15, 2010....18,947......41,499.......1.00
Aug 31, 2010.....18,975.......8,852.......2.14
Aug 13, 2010.....53,603.........230.....233.06
Jul 30, 2010.....65,831.......9,077.......7.25
Jul 15, 2010.....66,236.......8,989.......7.37
Jun 30, 2010.....90,910......17,648.......5.15
Jun 15, 2010.....91,395......82,313.......1.11
May 28, 2010........730.....195,099.......1.00
May 14, 2010......2,510......10,570.......1.00
Apr 30, 2010......2,355.....127,880.......1.00

The main thing I notice in the data is that covering has taken place in the WAMKQ reducing the shorts in the Ks from 303,000 to 210,000 during first half of the month. I expect to see the other short interest also reduce as we get closer to the Examiner's report in November

The data for short interest is published twice each month. The schedule for when the data is provided to the public can be found here:
http://www.quantpartners.com/research/erlanger/calendarPrintFriendly.html

The second half of September will not be out until October 12 so there is considerable delay from when the data is collected until when it is available to the public.

I get my data from the "Short Sales" tab found for WAMUQ (for example) off of this link below:
http://www.otcmarkets.com/stock/wamuq/quote#getQuote

You will need to look up each stock separately. Links to the tabs pages don't paste accurately so I just put out the copy of the data without all the links. There are other useful information on the other links including all the SEC filings made by the Estate.

One only has to look the Tribune case-where they were and where they are now. This of course, assuming the Examiner cannot be bought off and his report is true. We will know if it is true within seconds, once we are privy to some or all of the report. Tribune filed bankruptcy in August of 2008.

http://abcnews.go.com/Business/wireStory?id=11500668

I also suggest people who doubt is to look at TRBCQ.PK historical prices between March 01 2009 to present and you will find a low of fifty two pennies to a high of seventeen dollars and currently is at sixteen dollars. The largest jump coming from July 01 through September 14, happening right after the Examiner’s report was released.

Prices
Date Open High Low Close Avg Vol Adj Close*
Sep 13, 2010 15.00 16.00 14.00 16.00 400 16.00
Sep 7, 2010 16.50 16.50 16.50 16.50 0 16.50
Aug 30, 2010 15.00 16.50 15.00 16.50 1,400 16.50
Aug 23, 2010 16.00 16.00 16.00 16.00 80,000 16.00
Aug 16, 2010 13.50 16.00 13.50 16.00 40,100 16.00
Aug 9, 2010 14.75 14.75 13.50 13.50 20,400 13.50
Aug 2, 2010 7.50 15.00 7.50 15.00 2,800 15.00
Jul 26, 2010 2.90 8.30 2.89 7.50 11,200 7.50
Jul 19, 2010 2.00 2.90 2.00 2.90 200 2.90
Jul 12, 2010 2.90 2.90 1.30 1.30 300 1.30
Jul 6, 2010 2.80 2.80 2.00 2.25 3,100 2.25
Jul 1, 2010 2.80 2.80 2.80 2.80 100 2.80

Tribune’s bankruptcy was only four to five weeks before WaMu’s and look at what they have been through, which is very similar to ours. I suggest for those who doubt my title to this thread to research and do your due diligence on these links and you will understand. So, bashers beware as facts can destroy your paid reasoning for being here. Below, are some links to keep the bashers busy and some information for WaMu’s true longs.

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Thanks for the post. Interesting similarity in that Tribune's management also colluded with JP Morgan, and that the Examiner (Klee) went so far as to interview Jamie Dimon.

"Klee described Tribune's decision to shoulder the additional debt as irresponsible and also chastised the deal's main lenders, a group including JPMorgan and Bank of America. Klee wrote that he found evidence the lenders suspected or even believed the additional debt might destroy Tribune, but he concluded they probably didn't engage in professional malpractice.

The findings were based on a review of thousands of pages of documents, as well as 38 interviews with some of the key players in the deal. The list of people interviewed included Jamie Dimon, CEO of JPMorgan Chase & Co. and former Tribune CEO Dennis FitzSimons"
...
"Klee said that if a court were to determine that the second step of the transaction were a case of fraudulent conveyance, lenders to the second step — including JPMorgan Chase, Citibank, Merrill Lynch and Bank of America — could be vulnerable to a claw back of payments they received"

El caso Tribune es un ejemplo de que un examiner puede cambiar la evolucion del proceso con su informe, si ha existido fraude en la transacción. En Wamu es mas evidente si cabe.

http://finance.yahoo.com/news/Examiner-sees-signs-of-apf-968269933.html?x=0&.v=9

http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/2010/09/wamuprivileged.html

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703694204575518222345640774.html

By DAN FITZPATRICK
J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. is putting federal regulators on notice that it may go after the very funds it used to buy Washington Mutual Inc.'s banking assets—and then some.

In a series of previously undisclosed letters sent to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., the nation's second-largest bank by assets warned it could seek billions in legal protection from the FDIC receivership that liquidated the Seattle-based thrift two years ago, people familiar with the situation said.

To the FDIC, the J.P. Morgan letters amount to more than $6 billion in claims, which would dwarf the $1.88 billion J.P. Morgan paid the receiver in September 2008, according to people familiar with the situation.

Experience WSJ professional Editors' Deep Dive: Banks Bank on ResolutionAMERICAN BANKER ONLINE
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Accounting for Loss Sharing. Access thousands of business sources not available on the free web. Learn More .J.P Morgan declined to comment, but another person familiar with the matter said J.P. Morgan didn't include specific dollar requests; instead, the bank submitted WaMu-related lawsuits and expects the FDIC receiver to absorb any losses stemming from them. Currently, the only funds available for such a payout are the $1.88 billion that J.P. Morgan paid.

The agreement J.P. Morgan signed with the FDIC in September 2008 allows the bank to file claims against the FDIC receivership, said Kevin Starke, an analyst with CRT Capital Group LLC in Stamford, Conn. The agreement states the receiver agrees to cover "liabilities of the failed bank" that weren't assumed by J.P. Morgan, which must provide "written notice" when it believes it is entitled to such protection.

But in at least one prominent federal case, the FDIC said J.P. Morgan is responsible for those losses, according to court documents filed by the FDIC last June in U.S. District Court in Washington, D.C. The documents were filed in response to a lawsuit by Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. on behalf of more than 100 trusts holding poor-performing WaMu mortgages. That lawsuit, seeking as much as $10 billion, named the FDIC and ultimately J.P. Morgan as co-defendants.

The letters to the FDIC are the latest example of how J.P. Morgan Chase could be helped by a deal struck at the height of the financial crisis. The collapse of WaMu was the largest bank failure in U.S. history, and J.P. Morgan's purchase gave it $188 billion in deposits and a coast-to-coast presence—2,207 additional branches—for the first time.

J.P. Morgan has benefitted from the WaMu transaction. The bank recorded a $2 billion gain based on accounting adjustments in 2008 and 2009, concluding the fair value of the assets was higher than what it paid. The bank has also said it may be able to earn as much as $25.5 billion in interest from its WaMu loans. It could receive as much as $6.9 billion in assets as part of a proposed settlement from the bankruptcy of WaMu's parent company, Mr. Starke said.

But J.P. Morgan recorded a $30 billion write-down related to the thrift's home-lending assets and added $1.5 billion to its loan-loss reserves because of expected losses in the WaMu portfolio.

The bank will be able to recover the value of some loans as conditions improve, said RBC Capital Markets banking analyst Gerard Cassidy in Portland, Maine. "We would expect this transaction to be extremely profitable to J.P. Morgan," he said.

Among those still upset about the J.P. Morgan purchase are the bondholders who had their holdings wiped out when the bank and FDIC decided not to honor the senior and subordinated debt holders.

Earlier this year, J.P. Morgan said it was willing to cap the size of its claims made against the FDIC receiver at $1.4 billion as long as that claim was awarded "priority" status. But bondholders balked at that idea, and J.P. Morgan dropped its request as part of a larger settlement of the WaMu bankruptcy case.

If J.P. Morgan asks the receiver to cover billions of dollars in new claims, "they are taking away with the right hand what they have given with the left," Mr. Starke said.

Write to Dan Fitzpatrick at [email protected]

les recomiendo leer el enlace que ha dejado venerado
el titular es claro : "WaMu se escapa con su documentación privilegiada ... Una vez más"
y sobre le final dice : Los tenedores de bonos se exige WaMu había renunciado el privilegio abogado-cliente, en general, al declarar, en documentos de la corte, que WaMu consultado con los abogados en su decisión de resolver las cuestiones con JP Morgan y otras partes, muestran documentos judiciales. Tal hallazgo extiende la exención pretendida mucho más allá del documento único de los tenedores de bonos afirmaron que estaban buscando, el equipo de Quinn Emanuel argumentó.
Le preguntamos a James Roquemore, el socio Greer Herz quien argumentó al respecto viernes, si su equipo estaba usando el único documento para provocar una renuncia más amplia. -No, no, no ", dice Roquemore. "Era sólo para ese documento."
En cualquier caso, la juez María Walrath dictaminó que WaMu nunca renunció a su privilegio de abogado-cliente. Ella estuvo de acuerdo con los abogados de Washington Mutual que nunca usaron el privilegio como una "espada" para defenderse de una demanda - y por lo tanto son libres de uso de privilegios como un "escudo" contra la solicitud de Texas. "No tenían ninguna razón legítima para pedir que entrometerse en nuestros materiales privilegiados", Elsberg nos dice. "Me complace el tribunal rechazó de inmediato su movimiento.""

UNA VEZ MAS, TENEMOS LAS DE PERDER. QUE FEO VIENE ESTO

Fuenteovejuna: Relajate hombre o te va a dar un telele.

La guerra de medios ha comenzado de nuevo, se hace una nota para hablar de un documento pero no se menciona lo más importante y es que la Juez aprobó el Discovery !!!!!

Se está distorsionando la realidad para jugar con los nervios de todos los que puedan caer.

Mira la misma historia escrita desde el prisma autentico:

WaMu Judge Tells JPMorgan To Give Docs To Insurers
By Lance Duroni

Law360, New York (September 24, 2010) -- A bankruptcy judge has ordered JPMorgan Chase & Co. to produce documents for a group of insurance companies that is suing the investment bank over claims on $50 million in bonds issued by Washington Mutual Inc.

Judge Mary F. Walrath of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware on Friday upheld the discovery request as it pertains to the litigation against JPMorgan currently pending in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia and concerning nonprivileged communications among JPMorgan, WaMu and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. about the global settlement in WaMu's bankruptcy.

American National Insurance Co., Farm Family Life Insurance Co., Pacific Property & Casualty Co. and several other insurers brought the suit alleging their claims on the bonds were unfairly released in the global settlement agreement.

“They are going to have to prove that the global settlement agreement was entered into in good faith,” said James Roquemore, an attorney for the insurance group.

Attorneys for WaMu argued that the group’s discovery request was “extraordinarily broad” and that the group is not a party-in-interest in the case because it does not hold a claim against the debtor.

The judge ruled that the group was indeed a party-in-interest and that there were factual issues that demanded the discovery.

JPMorgan has been hounded for months by allegations that it has been an obstacle to discovery in the WaMu case.

Holders of WaMu trust-preferred securities alleged in August that WaMu and JPMorgan provided them with thousands of documents and no “metadata” or other references to determine what information was relevant.

Daniel Brown, an attorney for the TPS holders, said the database was swimming with completely irrelevant information, such as golf reservations.

The TPS holders also said the debtors and JPMorgan were hiding mortgage servicing reports that could help them ascertain the value of the securities, which will be the subject of an adversary proceeding included in WaMu’s Chapter 11 plan confirmation process.

The various stakeholders in WaMu’s bankruptcy are awaiting a court-appointed examiner’s report on the settlement deal, due Nov. 1, that was requested by WaMu equity holders.

The settlement included a complete release of billions of dollars worth of claims by the debtors, its shareholders and creditors against the other two parties related to WaMu's closure. It would also reimburse JPMorgan for its purchase of WaMu's assets.

The report will attempt to answer questions about how and why WaMu failed, the events that led to intervention by the FDIC, the events that led to the sale to JPMorgan, and the role of JPMorgan and other entities in the seizure and sale of WaMu's assets.

WaMu is represented in the bankruptcy by Richards Layton & Finger PA and Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP.

The insurance group is represented by Greer Herz & Adams LLP.

The district court litigation is In re: American National Life Insurance Co. et al. v. JPMorgan Chase & Co. et al., case number 09-1743, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.

The bankruptcy case is In re: Washington Mutual Inc. et al., case number 08-12229-MFW, in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware.

http://bankruptcy.law360.com/articles/196583