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Washington Mutual demanda a la FDIC por 17 billones US$ + daños

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Washington Mutual demanda a la FDIC por 17 billones US$ + daños
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Washington Mutual demanda a la FDIC por 17 billones US$ + daños
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Hoy me he dad cuenta Tengo un hermano gemelo perdido en el foro

Tras muchos años sin saber nada hoy me he topado con esta sorpresa, he encontrado a un hermano gemelo parece que vive en Vigo y encima le hacen usuario del dia? jajajajaja tendré que hablar con nuestra madre pqrque yo no sabía nada del gemelo.

Estos secretos de familia...el a Vigo y yo en Sevilla.
Raro raro raro !!! :)


Susman demanda a las grandes tecnologicas a petición de Paul Allen (Ex Microsoft)



A nmi si gana Allen me da igual (un pobre billonario) que busca sacar tajada de una patente, a costa de la innovación de otros
lo que me gusta de esta noticia es que elija a Susman para hacerlo... eso ya es otra historia.


Lo que tiene el Examiner

On the eve of the Examiner’s preliminary report, he and his team of 13 highly-skilled attorneys, backed-up by squads of financial professionals, have in their possession, the following documents, which I have ranked in their order of importance:

1. Though perhaps not a document, the most important piece of information possessed by the Examiner and his team are the fears and suspicions of the Trustee, which were no doubt communicated to Hochberg shortly after his appointment (i.e., the “exigent circumstances uncovered in December that lead to the formation of the EC, which in turn ultimately led to Hochberg’s appointment).

2. The sealed document that directly led to the examiner’s appointment. The power of this document cannot be overestimated, in that it speaks for itself and did, no doubt, provide an examiner bearing the DOJ credentials of Hochberg, with a preliminary set of unanswered questions that would lead in promising directions. Additionally, that document - WHATEVER is was/is – poses a very real and immediate challenge to Hochberg’s professional reputation, as it strongly suggests that there’s SOMETHING that’s not quite right about this particular bankruptcy.

3. Solomon’s asset “presentation” which has now been reviewed by SG, AG, the EC, A&M and WGM. We can all SAFELY AND COMFORTABLY assume that if Solomon’s valuation of the debtor’s estate were not FAR GREATER than that of A&M’s valuation, then it would not have been formally “presented” by SG to A&M and WGM way back in June. Instead, it would have been quietly circulated among only that of SG, AG and the EC, while Solomon awaited the further discovery efforts of SG, in the hope that additional assets, as discovered and identified, could be plugged into it. Obviously, SG would not have gone ‘shopping for a settlement’ way back in June without having the benefit of sufficient currency (i.e., a really big asset valuation number that would blow that of A&M’s out of the water). Hochberg has had the benefit of that “presentation” for several weeks now, and his team of financial experts (including the recently retained law firm that has the same degree of restructuring expertise that A&M has) have poured over its content, comparing and contrasting it with that of A&M’s, and have reached their preliminary conclusions. In fact, it’s EXACTLY why they were hired, as no one on Hochberg’s team had that particular kind of specialized expertise … expertise that Hochberg thought necessary to deploy.

4. The benefit of SG’s growing belief (supported by its (SG’s) independent research and discovery efforts thus far) that fraud and/or malpractice has been perpetrated/committed in a crucial aspect of the bankruptcy proceedings. This is such a sensitive and damning belief that Hochberg and his professionals cannot pay scant attention to it, but must thoroughly investigate all such aspects of it. This “growing belief” directly ties back to the fears and suspicions first communicated to Hochberg after his appointment.

As the Examiner has not yet issued a subpoena - for either testimony or documents – we can all comfortably conclude that his investigation is meeting with little or no resistance thus far; and that he is gathering information in an expeditious fashion; exactly what Walrath wanted him to do.


Re: La juez firma la devolución de impuestos

Bueno, para mi en este caso no está claro que sea una estrategia para que A


Re: La juez firma la devolución de impuestos

Pero yo sinceramente pienso que esos 'flecos pendientes' que dejan los debtors van a facilitar que llegado el momento, la jueza saque el listado (o si no ya se encargará Susman de recordárselo) y dictamine en función a ello.

Yo creo que la advertencia a Rosen de que también el EC eran sus clientes, ha marcado un antes y un después, aunque en lineas generales no tome decisiones drásticas que puedan romper las posibles 'ongoing talkings' (negociaciones que se estén llevando a cabo).

Cuando el Examiner presente el informe preliminar, espero que la jueza diga -hasta aquí hemos llegado, rompemos la baraja-.

A ver lo que pasa.


Re: La juez firma la devolución de impuestos

La Juez solamente tiene una cosa en mente y es que todo caiga por su propio peso... entonces las partes perjudicadas solo tendran una vía y es la de llegar a un Settlement (acuerdo). De lo contrario podriamos entrar en un juicio que dure varios años, cosa que no creo ocurra pues en el momento que se destape todo el fraude que se ha cometido rodaran cabezas (la primera la de Rosen).

Esta Juez ve más allá de los $4 Billones, porque recordemos esos se pueden considerar nuestros pero hay mucho más, si ella empieza a fallar esto iria a juicio y creo que eso no nos interesa (de momento) si no hay otra alternativa pues tendremos que optar por esa vía pero... ¿les interesará una investigación del Departamento de Justicia a los que crearon este desaguisado?

7 de septiembre esta fecha junto con la del día que se creo el EC y se aprobó el examiner será una de las importantes en este caso.


La conspiración de los ricos

Este fin de semana me estoy leyendo este libro gratis online publicado por Robert Kiyosaki.


Os lo recomiendo.


Excelente analisis (Foro Yahoo)

There was settlement negotiations between EC and debtors in June. On this point, I agree with some posters, especially iHUB’s Williams48, based on the information scanned from Susman’s June billing statement. I also think the settlement negotiations happened right around mid-June, during “meet and confer” period. But after June 17th hearing, the buzz on the settlement became quiet. It looked like there was a breakdown in negotiations.

So what happened?

My guess is, on June 10, EC received some sort of “offer” from the debtor (see Justin’s 6/10 entry “reviewing offers”). On the same day, Justin immediately made effort “conferring with opposing counsel”. One can argue the “offer” and “conferring” referred to debtors’ work products. But based on multiple mentioning of “settlement” or “settlement negotiations” in the subsequent entries between 6/10 and 6/20, it was likely the “offer” was related to settlement talks. Interestingly, on 6/11, Susman made two length calls to EC, one lasted two hours and another one hour. On 6/12, Susman conferred with EC again for another hour. In a few days, Susman made several phone calls to EC (including one to EC chairman M. Willingham), totaling 6 hours, which was ½ of Susman’s total billing hours in June (12 in total). My guess is there was an intense negotiations going on during the period. Susman was likely giving EC status reviews and mapping out new strategies based on debtors’ offer, EC’s input, P. J. Solomon’s valuation presentation, and other available information. Meanwhile, on 6/11 EC counsel (Sargent) started to ask P.J. Solomon for valuation presentation. Based on recent PJS billing statement, we know the firm logged in hundreds of hours analyzing debtors’ assets. But this was the first time we had some confirmation that PJS worked out an asset valuation presentation. It was very likely that EC counsel needed PJS numbers as a base to compare notes with debtors’ offer. When all those activities took place, we can recall Rosen said to the Court prior to and during 6/17 hearing there was on-going “good faith negotiations” between debtors and EC. They were not coincident.

Contrary to Williams48’s estimate, however, I think debtor’s June offer was very low. You can tell that by observing the stagnant share prices during that time. (If the offer was large enough, I think there would be inevitably some leaks. Big boys always knew first. You can understand this by recalling/observing the steady rise of wmi bond prices since 11/2009). I also think that the fund for the June settlement offer likely came from tax refund dollars. If you study the billing statement carefully, you will notice just prior to 6/10, EC counsel did intense researches on tax issues, including “documentary evidence of tax issues”. My guess is EC counsel possibly poked some serious holes in debtors’ tax argument. Because of serious pressures from the Court and discovery/examiner issue, together with their indefensible positions on tax issues, debtors were forced to show its hands first by offering some of the tax refunds for settlement with EC. (At this point, I am neither able to nor going to speculate on what the forms of that settlement offer could be. No matter cash only, rights/shares in newly emerged company, or a combination of both).

The reasons that EC rejected the debtors’ offer were obvious: the offer was way below the acceptable level by shareholders. It was inevitable that there were great discrepancies between debtors’ offer and PJS asset valuation. Based on PJS valuation presentation, EC and its counsel rightfully rejected debtors’ offer. (I also noticed somewhere in the billing statement there is an EC asset valuation too. M. Willingham, being a number guy himself, I’ll not be surprised to know he and other EC member worked out some numbers themselves for Susman team and PJS’ references. So it would be more accurate to say EC rejected debtors’ offer based on PJS valuation, EC members’ own researches, and EC legal counsel’s guidance). Equally if not more importantly, the offer was also rejected because it was lack of business tort claims against JPMC. If you scan the billing statement, entries for researches on tort claims were all over the place. During 6/10-6/20 period, some entries specifically mentioned “Fraudulent transfer” and “unjust enrichment”. The EC, its legal counsel, and business consultant will not let JPMC (with debtor counsel’s assistance) get away from the unjust enrichment and intentional fraud.

I think the recent active pursuit of TPS issue is somewhat related to June settlement talks too. It possibly worked this way: debtors were willing to throw TPS off the bus and offered small bones to EC from tax refund dollars. EC rejected the offer based on PJS valuation and the lack of tort claims. Debtors’ counsel then stacked the EC with TPS and “Third Party claims” just like they did it all along. It could be indicated by debtors that you (EC) better take the offer and go away. To do that, we (debtors) will go around TPS claims. If you (EC) refuse the offer, you will find a mountain of TPS and third party claims in front of you. Then you will end up with nothing. This is what I call “divide and conquer”, also “carrots and big sticks” . EC is the most dangerous party to debtors, JPM, and FDIC. They recognize that and need EC to go away badly. As I said EC rightfully rejected the offer. Meanwhile, you can see during this couple weeks EC’s interests and researches on TPS issue intensified. I think TPS got a wind of debtors-EC negotiations, and started pursuing debtors/JPMC for discovery and compensation relentlessly than ever before. I think TPS and EC (EC contacted TPS counsel during this period according to the billing) are in agreement that TPS value goes with its underlying assets. JPMC as the asset holder should pay for it. And subsequently a huge burden of nearly $4 billion will be lifted from the estate balance sheet, which benefits the equity holders immediately.

It’s also interesting to notice there were several entries for claims against “auditor malpractice” and other “intentional” frauds. They were likely the by-products of the settlement negotiations when EC was reviewing and comparing debtors’ offer and PJS valuations. The settlement talks seemed getting off track by later June. But I am not upset with it if that’s what happened. It’s nonetheless a promising beginning. The EC and its counsel did the right thing. As I said debtors were forced to negotiate with the EC on settlement because of the pressures from the Court and discovery/examiner issues. It was also possible a tactic by debtors to find out what’s the bottom line of EC demands. I don’t think EC fell into their tricks. EC might show debtors a few relevant numbers but no way the complete PJS report. The full scale of PJS valuation, in my view, will be reserved for the final showdown when the examiner completes its report.

It’s encouraging to read Susman’s June billing statement. The battle is far from over yet. But I am very happy with our team and what EC legal counsel, EC, and PJS are doing. I said before, don’t be obsessed with Rosen’s antics. If you want to know how we are going to win, look and pay attention to what Susman’s doing.